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STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT FOR
BUILDER-VENDORS OF HOMES
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960's, courts and legislatures have exercised great liberty
in expanding the liability of manufacturers.1 Prodded by trends in judi-
cial decisions, legislatures began using the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A2 as a model to draft laws which allowed claims against manufac-
turers of products without the traditional common law burden of proving
1. See generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 95-104A
(5th ed. 1984); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. REV.
791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall] (In this article, Prosser describes the rapid expansion of
the theory of strict liability in tort and the downfall of the long-standing privity doctrine. Prosser
cites Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), as the landmark case
which marked the beginning of the end for the privity requirement.); Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The As-
sault] (In this article, Prosser outlines the history of strict liability from the early 1900's, when Judge
Cardozo crushed the requirement of privity, to the date of the article. So many exceptions in the
traditional theory had been recognized that the theory was practically non-existent in the context of
many products.); 3 AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D (LCP BW) §§ 38:1-38:24 (1987) (This publication exam-
ines real estate defects and the various legal theories which an injured party may use to recover
damages.); Bieman, Strict Products Liability. An Overview of State Law, 10 J. PROD. LIAB. 111
(1987); Chan, The Builder's Burden of Defective Construction-Part I, 13 COLO. LAw. 2021 (1984)
[hereinafter Chan, Part I]; Chan, The Builder's Burden of Defective Construction-Part II, 13 COLO.
LAW. 2234 (1984) [hereinafter Chan, Part II] (This article explores the liability of developers of
commercial real estate and differentiates between the "sophisticated" commercial buyer and the
average residential home buyer. Based upon this distinction, the author states that caveat emptor
should apply to the sophisticated buyer who is on equal footing with the builder.); Hiner, Strict
Liability and the Building Industry, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 373 (1985) (This article sketches the history of
products liability law and critically examines the holding of Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965), which applies strict liability in tort to the building industry. The author con-
cludes that the inherent differences between buildings and products preclude the application of strict
liability in tort to real estate.); Walker, The Expanding Applicability of Strict Liability Principles:
How is a 'Product'Defined, 22 TORT & INS. L. J. 1 (1986); Note, Liability of Builder-Vendor Blagg
v. Fred Hunt Co., 35 ARK. L. REv. 654 (1982); Note, Strict Tort Liability to The Builder Vendor of
Homes Schipper and Beyond, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 103 (1983) (This note discusses the applicabil-
ity of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A to the real estate context.); Note, When the Walls Come
Tumbling Down-Theories of Recovery for Defective Housing, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 670 (1982); 63
AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability §§ 528-77 (1984); Annotation, Liability of Builder or Subcontractor
for Insufficiency of Building Resulting from Latent Defects in Materials Used, 61 A.L.R. 3D 792
(1975) (This article discusses the development of the law in relation to builders' liability when,
through no fault of the builder, latently defective materials are used in the construction of a
building.).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
1
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negligence. Since those early decisions and enactments, liability has con-
tinued to expand beyond what was envisioned by the writers of § 402A,
eventually encompassing defendants who clearly should not be exposed
to this strict liability.'
One type of defendant who should not be exposed to strict liability is
the builder-vendor of residential homes-not because these defendants
are not prone to error, but because traditional tort and contract theories
are sufficient tools for plaintiffs to recover for legitimate harm. Applying
strict liability to defects in homes would provide a powerful weapon for
some plaintiffs with dubious claims.4 In addition, this application would
preclude defendants from asserting several defenses.' Protecting con-
sumers from potentially dangerous products and placing the cost of inju-
ries on the makers of the products were the purposes for which the
theory of strict liability in tort was developed,6 but the doctrine's expan-
sion to include residential real estate surpasses the logical boundaries
within which the doctrine was meant to be contained.7
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
ld.
3. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1. Writing about the decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), Prosser states:
The citadel fell. The method of storming it was not unlike that of Cardozo in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. long since, where the negligence exception as to 'inherently' or 'immi-
nently' dangerous products was expanded to swallow up the rules as to all products. Now
the special rule as to food and drink was expanded to engulf the rest.
Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1, at 793 (citations omitted). In addition, Prosser states that "[w]hat
has followed has been the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in
the entire history of the.law of torts." Id. at 793-94 (citations omitted).
4. See Milam v. Midland Corp., 282 Ark. 15, 665 S.W.2d 284 (1984) (where the plaintiff
alleged the real estate developer was strictly liable for the plaintiff's motorcycle accident injury
because the development had a street with a curve that was too sharp).
5. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 528 (1984) (Defenses which the defendant may not
use in a strict liability in tort cause of action are: 1) lack of privity, 2) lack of notice to the defendant
of breach of warranty, 3) lack of reliance on a warranty, and 4) disclaimer of implied warranties).
6. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 (5th ed. 1984);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market.").
7. For a discussion of related topics, see Note, Landlord-Tenant: Landlord's Strict Liability
For Personal Injury Arising From Latent Defects In Premises, Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454,
2
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
The development of strict liability in tort has been a five stage pro-
cess which began in the middle of the nineteenth century. The first stage
of the theory's development lasted over 70 years, the second stage lasted
nearly 30 years, the third stage lasted 18 years, the fourth stage was a
mere fficker in time, and the fifth stage of rapid, overreaching expansion
has dominated the last 20 years. This expansion has far exceeded the
scope envisioned by the originators of the theory, and today, strict liabil-
ity plays a dominant role in the decisions of virtually every business
venture.
A. Stage One: Quasi-Caveat Emptor
The first stage in the development of strict liability began in 1842
with the case of Winterbottom v. Wright,8 an English decision which dis-
played a rigid application of the requirement of privity.9 In Winterbot-
tom, the plaintiff, a mail coach driver employed by the Postmaster
General, was injured when a wheel of the mail coach he was driving
collapsed due to disrepair."0 The defendant was a manufacturer-repairer
of coaches who had contracted with the Postmaster General to keep all
of the mail coaches in good, safe, working condition.' The plaintiff's
claim for damages was denied because he had no privity of contract with
the defendant. Only the plaintiff's employer, the Postmaster General,
had a cause of action against the defendant because the Postmaster Gen-
eral was a party to the contract. 12
Winterbottom represented the state of legal theory at the time. The
doctrine of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) could only be defeated if
the injured party had entered into a contract with the defendant which
698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985), 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 561; Note, Becker v. IRM Corporation:
Strict Liability in Tort for Residential Landlords, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 349 (1986); Note, A
Bird in the Hand: California Imposes Strict Liability on Landlords in Becker v. IRM Corp., 20 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 323 (1987); Note, Let the Landlord Beware: California Imposes Strict Liability on
Lessors of Rental Housing, 51 Mo. L. REv. 899 (1986); Note, Landlord-Tenant. Becker v. IRM
Corporation: Will Strict Liability Reach Oklahoma?, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 304 (1986); Comment,
Oklahoma's Statute of Repose Limiting the Liability of Architects and Engineers for Negligence: A
Potential Nightmare, 22 TULSA L.J. 85 (1986); Note, Elden v. Simmons: The Standard of Reasona-
bleness Prevails-Implied Warranties of New Home Construction Do Not 'Necessarily' Terminate on
Resale in Oklahoma, 17 TULSA L.J. 753 (1982).
8. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
9. R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 10-15 (1980).
10. 10 M. & W. 109, 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 402-03 (Ex. 1842).
11. Id. at 115, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
12. Id. at 116, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
1988]
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covered the injury involved. 13 This theory was designed to protect sup-
pliers of products from economic ruin. Also implicit in the theory was
the idea that consumers had a duty to inspect products to find any
defects. 14
In the late eighteen hundreds, courts began to recognize exceptions
to the strict requirement of privity, allowing third parties to collect dam-
ages without having privity in certain situations. As stated by the court
in Huset v. J I Case Threshing Machine Co.,15 the first exception dealt
with a manufacturer's negligence in dealing with products, such as drugs,
that are imminently dangerous to human life. 6 Another exception was
found in cases where an owner's act of negligence caused a third party to
be injured by a defective product.17 A third exception arose in relation to
products deemed "imminently dangerous." 18 The various contexts in
which strict liability was found included nuisance, workmen's compensa-
tion, respondeat superior, dangerous animals, escaping substances, and
ultra-hazardous activities.19 Thus, the first stage in the life of strict liabil-
ity in tort began with a sometimes harsh privity requirement and ended
when that requirement became so riddled with exceptions that the next
step was almost expected.2 °
B. Stage Two: Overturning the Privity Requirement
The strict privity requirement set forth in Winterbottom came to an
abrupt halt in 1916 with the decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.21
The defendant automobile manufacturer had sold an automobile to a re-
tailer who subsequently resold it to the plaintiff.22 The plaintiff was in-
jured when one of the wheels collapsed while he was driving the car.23
The manufacturer argued that the plaintiff's claim must fail because no
13. For a discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Comment, The Case Against Strict
Liability Protection for New Home Buyers in Ohio, 14 AKRON L. REV. 103 (1980).
14. See Chan, Part I, supra note I (The author discusses the role of caveat emptor where buyer
and seller are on an equal footing as in a transaction involving a commercial real estate purchase.).
15. 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
16. Id. at 870.
17. Id. at 870-71.
18. Id. at 871.
19. In addition to these contexts, the use of products liability was expanding to include a great
new assortment of items. See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1, at 805-14; Prosser, The Assault, supra
note I, at 1110-14.
20. Hiner, supra note I, at 375-76.
21. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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contract between the two parties existed.24 In a famous opiniov, Judge
Cardozo boldly abrogated the privity requirement,25 reasoning that the
defendant clearly knew that its automobiles would be used by persons
other than the initial buyer, the retailer.26 Furthermore, Cardozo went
on to hold that the automobile was an "imminently dangerous" product
and upheld the plaintiff's right to sue the defendant manufacturer, even
though there was no contract guaranteeing such rights.27
Although the elimination of the privity requirement was a substan-
tial factor in the development of strict liability in tort, it may not have
been the most important one. The most influential factor in the develop-
ment of strict liability did not happen in any court of law; it happened in
the marketplace.28 The rapid growth of industry in America in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century led to changes not only in the
products produced and the manufacturing processes used, but to changes
in the consumer as well. The variety and number of mass produced
products owned by consumers grew rapidly, and the consumer's knowl-
edge and expertise in appraising these products dropped at an equally
rapid pace.29 In this setting, legal reformers like Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court formulated new theories of liability for manu-
facturers of products.3"
During the first half of the twentieth century, no theory of strict
liability in tort existed. With the privity requirement gone,31 however,
plaintiffs could proceed with a "products liability" of sorts by proving a
negligent act or omission by a defendant manufacturer.32 This tool for
injured plaintiffs seemed to be inadequate, though, when advanced
24. Id.
25. Id. at--, 111 N.E. at 1053.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 529 (1984); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.
2d 453, -, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) ("As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with
its great markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and con-
sumer of a product has been altered.").
29. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at -, 150 P.2d at 443.
30. Id.
31. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
32. Hiner, supra note 1, at 374-75. Hiner states:
As negligence became the prevailing theory of tort law, attempts to impose strict liability
were looked on with disfavor by the courts. However, even when negligence was in its
heyday, strict liability survived in some areas under the guise of exceptions to the negli-
gence rule. As a result, in the mid-nineteenth century, defendants were being held strictly
liable in tort for blasting, for injuries inflicted by animals kept on their property, and for
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against a large corporate manufacturing company. Thus, the legal re-
formers did some manufacturing of their own. Much the same way that
exceptions had riddled the privity requirement, new theories emerged for
the plaintiff's arsenal, such as negligence per se, negligence based on res
ipsa loquitur, breach of an implied or express warranty, and various crea-
tive means to circumvent the warranty defenses traditionally advanced
by defendants.3" These innovative tort theories eventually led to the cre-
ation of the ultimate plaintiffs' weapon: strict liability in tort.
C. Stage Three: The Genesis of Strict.Liability in Tort
Justice Traynor is credited with first espousing "pure" strict liability
in tort by discarding all of the various "half-hearted" tort theories (used
to supplement the traditional negligence cause of action) and drafting a
clear, direct, easy-to-apply doctrine.34 This theory was introduced in
Traynor's concurring opinion in the 1944 decision, Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.35
Escola involved a plaintiff waitress who picked up a bottle of Coca-
Cola from a case which had just been delivered to the restaurant.36 The
bottle burst in the plaintiff's hand, inflicting deep cuts. 37 The majority
opinion* upheld the plaintiff's right to proceed against the defendant
manufacturer on the grounds of res ipsa loquitur.38 Under this doctrine,
negligence can be inferred, thus shifting the burden of proof. This shift
depends upon the plaintiff's showing that the "defendant had exclusive
control of the thing causing the injury and that the accident is of such a
nature that it ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence by
the defendant."39 Although the defendant did not literally have exclu-
sive control over the bottle at the time of the accident, the court broad-
ened the rule to hold that the defendant's exclusive control need not be at
33. Id. Hiner states:
In contrast to the prevailing requirement of a showing of negligence, the courts at the turn
of the century began to protect a class of injured plaintiffs who were unable to make out a
successful case in negligence. Adoption of such devices as res ipsa loquitur and abolition of
the privity defense lowered the hurdles for plaintiffs with tort causes of action, but the
courts held to the requirement that fault on the part of the defendant be proven. Later,
contract remedies were also expanded: the concept of implied warranties was stretched to
the point that contractual privity was no longer required.
Id. at 375-76. (citations omitted).
34. Bieman, supra note 1 at 114.
35. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
36. Id. at-, 150 P.2d at 437.
37. Id. at -, 150 P.2d at 438.
38. Id. at-, 150 P.2d at 440.
39. Id. at-, 150 P.2d at 438. See also Hiner, supra note 1, at 375 n.12. The author explains
[Vol. 24:117
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the time of the accident, but only at the time that the negligence
occurred.4o
Justice Traynor agreed with the result that the plaintiff's cause of
action should be allowed, but he did not espouse the rationale of the
majority."a Traynor began his discussion by stating a concise rule of law:
"In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs
an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to human beings."'42
First, Traynor explained that the doctrine should be applied regard-
less of privity or negligence.43 The rationale for this theory is that liabil-
ity should be administered in a way to encourage manufacturers to make
their products as safe as possible. This encouragement allegedly evolves
from making manufacturers responsible for consequences arising from
the reasonable use of those products.' Without such liability, the loss
will be placed on the injured party, who is generally less able to shoulder
such a burden.4" On the other hand, a manufacturer who is forced to
compensate those injured from the reasonable use of its product can
spread the loss by including a premium on the price of the product."
that the burden of showing negligence normally rests upon the plaintiff but that res ipsa loquitur
shifts that burden:
If the plaintiff can prove that the accident which caused the injury is one that normally
would not have occurred without negligence, the presumption arises that it was the negli-
gence of the defendant who controlled the instrumentality of the accident that caused the
injury. Thus, after the plaintiff proves that the accident occurred and caused his injury, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove he was not negligent. W. L. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 39 (4th ed. 1971). Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 582-83, 22 P. 266, 266-
69 (1889) (the fact of elevator falling establishes presumption of negligence); Byrne v.
Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722 (Exch. 1863) (the fact of barrel falling from loft is prima facie
evidence of negligence).
Hiner, supra note 1, at 375 n.12.
40. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 438 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).




45. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. See also Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972), which questions whether strict liability in tort deters
manufacturers from producing defective goods. The authors assert that strict liability should only be
imposed on the "cheapest cost avoider." Placing liability on the party who is determined by the trier
of fact to be in the best position to make a cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance costs would reduce the cost of accidents. But see Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). This article maintains that under a negligence standard, potential vic-
tims have more incentive to decrease accident costs than they would have under strict liability.
Posner argues that imposition of strict liability does not create an incentive to invest in research to
produce safer goods, but merely shifts the incentive from the potential victim to the manufacturer.
46. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
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Therefore, the manufacturer is "self-insuring" by setting price increases
which are ultimately absorbed by the public.4 7 Traynor, seeing this lia-
bility applicable to certain types of dangerous and potentially dangerous
products, desired to impose liability on manufacturers solely because
they are responsible for having placed the product on the market.
48
Another purpose for strict liability, as pointed out by Justice Tray-
nor, is that an injured party is not in a strong "position to refute such
evidence [of a manufacturing defect] or identify the cause of the defect,
for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as the man-
ufacturer himself is." 49 Traynor later explained that with the change in
the nature of the marketplace (the industrial revolution) and the change
in the level of knowledge of the average consumer, there has come a
change in the "close relationship between the producer and consumer."50
The increased complexity of manufacturing processes, the decline in con-
sumer expertise in being able to investigate product quality, and the
efforts of manufacturers to bolster consumer confidence through market-
ing were the changes in the marketplace observed by Traynor."
A third rationale is that the strict liability in tort doctrine will pro-
vide plaintiffs with a direct, short-cut method of recovery. This is helpful
not only in reducing a plaintiff's litigation expenses, but also in making
more efficient use of court time.5 2
Justice Traynor's final and most important point concerned the re-
scission of a privity of contract requirement. Traynor pointed out that in
the modern marketplace consumers purchase many products without the
inconvenience of separately contracting for each item. 3 Using food
products as an example, Traynor stated that "the right of a consumer
injured by unwholesome food does not depend upon the intricacies of the
law of sales and that the warranty of the manufacturer to the consumer
in absence of privity of contract rests on public policy." 4 For these rea-
sons, Justice Traynor concluded that the waitress injured in Escola
should not have to rely on res ipsa loquitur, as the majority opinion held,
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at -, 150 P.2d at 443.
50. Id.
51. Id. Justice Traynor described the system of recovery after MacPherson as a circuitous sys-
tem which "engenders wasteful litigation." Traynor suggested that, if the injured party's action
could be based directly on the manufacturer's warranty, much of the waste would be curtailed. Id.
at -, 150 P.2d at 442.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 24:117
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss1/5
STRICT LIABILITY FOR BUILDERS
but should be allowed to recover under a theory of strict liability.55
D. Stage Four: The Doctrine Comes of Age
In 1962, Justice Traynor wrote another opinion, this time for the
majority and for nothing less than what he had asked for in Escola. In
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,56 the plaintiff received a wood-
working power tool as a gift from his wife, who had purchased the tool
from the defendant retailer. 7 After the plaintiff was injured by a piece of
wood hurled from the machine under normal operating conditions, 8 the
plaintiff sued both the retailer and the manufacturer. A trial court deci-
sion in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed in Justice Traynor's now fa-
mous opinion which reflects the concept he espoused in Escola.5 9
A second significant event in this fourth stage was the publication of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965.6 Restatements traditionally
adopt the law as affected by the latest trends, and the drafters of this
Restatement adopted Traynor's concept of strict liability in tort.61 This
short turn of events in stage four resulted in the coming of age of the
theory of strict liability in tort.
E. Stage Five: A Good Concept Outgrows Its Logical Boundaries
The theory of strict liability in tort was conceived as a method of
achieving social justice by combatting the dangerous side-effects of the
industrial revolution. Therefore, "enterprise liability" was imposed on
defendant manufacturers based on the assumption that their intentional
profit-making activity exposed consumers to a risk that should be
shouldered by the enterprise itself.62 The "modern consumer," unsophis-
ticated in the ways of mass production, now had a short-cut to recover-
ing for injuries sustained as a result of using a dangerous or defective
55. Id. at -, 150 P.2d at 440.
56. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
57. Id. at 698, 377 P.2d at 898.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
60. See supra note 2.
61. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and subsequent case holdings differ signifi-
cantly in their statement of the rule of law. In both Escola and Greenman, Justice Traynor was
careful to include a qualification to the rule, "[t]he manufacturer's liability should, of course, be
defined in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use, and should not extend to
injuries that cannot be traced to the product as it reached the market." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 444 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
62. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 (5th ed. 1984);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, -, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring) ("Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
1988]
9
Frizzell: Strict Liability in Tort for Builder-Vendors of Homes
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
product. Public policy and fairness dictated that these special consumers
should no longer have the burden of proving negligence, fraud, or the
existence of an implied warranty. Thus, a less complicated method of
recovery developed. 3
The expansion of the doctrine of strict liability in tort after the the-
ory's acceptance, 4 however, seems to have given courts the power to
decide to which industries the heightened liability will apply. Although
strict liability in tort has been praised for making manufacturers of dan-
gerous products more cautious, it has also been criticized for inhibiting
the development of new products.6 5  Thus, a court decision addressing
the applicability of strict liability in tort to a new industry may decide its
ultimate success or failure. The authority to so decide an industry's fate
is considered by some to be legislative.66
Many industries have been directly affected by the imposition of
strict liability as advanced by purchasers of their products. Strict liabil-
ity, as it relates to drug manufacturers, has evoked commentary about
the doctrine's inhibitive effect on the development of new drugs. In
addition, strict liability in.tort has been extended to persons traditionally
thought of as providers of services rather than products. "Dram shop"
owners, sellers of intoxicating liquor, have been held strictly liable for
injuries caused by an intoxicated patron.6 8 Hospitals and blood banks
have been held strictly liable for transfusing blood which caused injury to
a patient 9.6  The mechanical and administrative services provided by a
hospital may also result in strict liability.70
Finally, although the plaintiff must still prove the existence of a de-
fect, the definition of "defect" has undergone expansion. Traditional def-
initions of "defective design" were based on the fitness of the product as
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products
that reach the market.").
63. See Note, When the Walls Come Tumbling Down-Theories of Recovery for Defective Hous-
ing, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 670, 671-76 (1982).
64. For an overview of the speed and completeness which the theory of strict liability swept
through jurisdictions of the United States, see Bieman, supra note I (traces the history of products
liability law and provides an exhaustive account of the status of the doctrine in every state of the
union).
65. Walker, supra note 1, at 2; see Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205
(1973).
66. Walker, supra note 1, at 2.
67. Id. at 8.
68. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 81 (5th ed. 1984).
69. Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner, 470 So. 2d 878 (La. 1985). See also Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965) (In this 1965
article, Traynor explained that the definition of "product" had not yet encompassed blood.).
70. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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originally designed. New theories require manufacturers to design prod-
ucts to protect consumers from reasonably foreseeable misuse of the
product.71 Thus, the concept of design defect has been altered to require
foresight on the part of the manufacturer.7" All of these expansions on
the application of strict liability in tort are outside of the area originally
envisioned by Justice Traynor and the other original supporters of strict
liability in tort.
III. ELEMENTS OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
The theory of strict liability in tort is not the same as absolute liabil-
ity.73 As stated by the court in Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt,74
just because a manufacturer is exposed to strict liability "does not...
mean that the maker is liable for any harm to anybody under any
circumstances. 75
The following elements must be proven for recovery under strict lia-
bility in tort:76 (1) There must be the sale of a product. (2) The product
must be sold by a seller engaged in the business of selling such a product.
(3) The product must be in a defective condition. (4) The defective con-
dition must render the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to the user or consumer's property. (5) The product must
reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it was sold. (6) The product must cause physical harm to the user or
consumer or to the user or consumer's property.77
No proof of negligence or privity is required under this doctrine.
The heaviest burden for the plaintiff, therefore, is proving a defective
condition. This element is discussed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts comment (g) of § 402A. Comment (g) generally states that there
are three basic types of defects: manufacturing defects, design defects,
and the failure to adequately warn the consumer of potential danger.78
71. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 76-77 (1980).
72. Id.
73. 2 AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D (LCP BW) § 16:5 (1987).
74. 385 F.2d 841 (1967), cert denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
75. Id. at 849.
76. Bieman, supra note 1, at 114. To these basic tests, various courts have added requirements
such as: That the plaintiff was unaware of the claimed defect; That the defendant knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the particular product would be used without
inspection for defects; The usefulness and desirability of the product; The ability to eliminate the
danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive; and
any other factor or factors the jury may believe may reasonably bear on the issue. Id.
77. 2 AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D (LCP BW) § 16:42 (1987).
78. Bieman, supra note 1, at 114.
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Strict liability in tort also bars the defendant from asserting many
traditional defenses. Prohibited defenses include lack of privity, lack of
notice to the defendant of breach of warranty, disclaimer, and lack of
reliance on a warranty.79
While a defective condition still must be proven, strict liability in
tort has provided consumers with a pernicious means to proceed against
manufacturers. Plaintiffs proceeding under strict liability in tort can ad-
vance without proving privity or negligence, while defendants are forced
to protect themselves half-armed, because certain defenses are pro-
scribed. Due to the "plaintiff-oriented" nature of strict liability in tort,
the imposition of the theory on any particular class of defendants must
be carefully scrutinized.
IV. STRICT LIABILITY AND REAL ESTATE
As previously discussed, the past twenty years have seen a rapid
expansion of the doctrine of strict liability into areas far beyond its ini-
tially intended boundaries. One area where the doctrine has been overex-
tended is real estate, and the state of the doctrine's development has
resulted in some courts holding strict liability applicable to real estate
and some courts holding to the contrary.
A. Courts Holding That Strict Liability in Tort Applies to Real Estate
Probably the most famous decision in this context is from a 1965
case, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.8 In Schipper, the infant son of the
lessee of a home was seriously scalded by hot water from a bathroom
79. See generally Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. App. 2d 710,-, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592, 604
(1966) (The court decided that contract and implied warranties were not applicable to the cause of
action based on strict liability in tort.); Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, 154 Conn. 549,
-, 227 A.2d 418, 424 (1967) (The court decided that the privity of contract requirement was not
applicable to a cause of action in strict liability in tort. The court also decided that the plaintiff need
not prove any reliance on the defendant's assertions as required by portions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, -, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965) (It is
not assertions or promotions of the vendor which make the defendant liable under strict liability in
tort, but merely the fact that the defendant's product appears in the market and produces an injury.);
Dart Equipment Corp. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 837, -, 88 Cal. Rptr. 670, 677-78
(1970) (This court found that strict liability in tort cannot be limited by contract.); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (This comment explains that the liability imlposed by this
doctrine is based purely on tort warranty rather than contract warranty. Therefore, the theory is not
dependent upon contract rules and defenses.).
80. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). This case has been cited in many other cases and has been
the subject of much analysis. See Note, Strict Tort Liability to The Builder Vendor of Homes: Schip-
per and Beyond?, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 103 (1983) (This note explains that strict liability was
initially applicable to food, then amended to include products connected to "intimate bodily use,"
and finally amended to include "any product." The author explains that in Schipper, the New
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faucet. The home was built by the defendant developer." l The defendant
was a mass developer of homes, and the lessor had purchased the home
after having seen a model home.82 A homeowner's guide given to the
lessor explained that the hot water was unusually hot in order to provide
sufficient heat for the heated tile floor in the home.83 The guide in-
structed that the cold water faucet should always be turned on before the
hot water faucet.84 Soon after moving into the home, the lessees realized
that the water was extremely hot.85 Before the situation could be cor-
rected, the lessee's infant son was badly scalded.86
The court in Schipper first considered the plaintiff's cause of action
based on negligence.87 Despite the lessee's knowledge of the hot water,
the court found the defendant negligent because a readily available and
relatively inexpensive cure for the hot water problem was admittedly re-
jected by the defendant.88 In reaching the conclusion that a builder-ven-
dor of homes could be held liable for negligence, the Schipper court cited
a number of cases which held that there is "no valid reason for any dis-
tinction between real and personal property so far as the principle of
liability is concerned." 89
The next cause of action considered by the Schipper court was based
on strict liability in tort.90 The court began by analogizing mass-pro-
duced homes to automobiles." From this point, the court applied case
law supporting strict liability for personal property.92 This leap in analy-
sis was justified by the court in its assertion that, in the face of change,
the judiciary has a duty to keep "its common law principles abreast of
the times."93 Continuing its analogy of automobiles to homes, the court
stated that buyers of mass-produced homes are as unable to protect
Jersey court extended the doctrine beyond the plain meaning of the words to include homes.). See
also Hiner, supra note 1, at 373.
81. Schipper, 44 N.J. at -, 207 A.2d at 317.
82. Id. at - 207 A.2d at 316.
83. Id. at-, 207 A.2d at 317. The water temperature in the house was 190 degrees Fahren-




87. Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 320.
88. Id. at-, 207 A.2d at 318. The excessively hot water problem could have been fixed by the
installation of a "mixing valve." Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 324.
89. Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 322.
90. Id. at-, 207 A.2d at 324.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at-, 207 A.2d at 325.
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themselves in deeds as purchasers of automobiles are with bills of sale.94
The court concluded by holding that the injured plaintiff could proceed
against the defendant based on theories of both negligence and strict lia-
bility in tort.9
5
Seven years after Schipper, the Washington State Court of Appeals
extended strict liability to builder-vendors in Gay v. Cornwall.96 In Gay,
the owner of a home under construction sold the property to the plaintiff,
who became the first occupant of the home upon completion of construc-
tion. 97 After moving into the home, the plaintiff began to discover de-
fects.98 The roof leaked profusely. 99 The chimney also leaked, which
caused damage to the electrical system."t° A sewer pipe broke, causing
sewage to back up under the house.'' The plaintiff also experienced
trouble with vents, the furnace, and external paint. 102 The Washington
court imposed strict liability on the builder-vendor based on an earlier
Washington Supreme Court decision.10 3  Although the earlier decision
was predicated on a contractual implied warranty, the Gay court further
expanded the liability of builder-vendors to strict liability in tort.10 4
With only a brief explanation, the Gay court stated that the fall of the
privity requirement led to strict liability for builder-vendors. 05
This leap from one extreme to the other disregards an expansive
middle ground of alternative remedies.' 0 6 Nine years after Gay the
Washington legislature adopted the Tort Reform Act of 1981 which pro-
vides for statutory liability for builder-vendors of defective mass pro-
duced homes.'0 7
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a house is a
"product" within the language of Arkansas' statutory products liability
law.'08 InBlagg v. Fred Hunt Co.,' 0 9 the plaintiff purchased a home built
94. Id. at-, 207 A.2d at 326.
95. Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 328.
96. 6 Wash. App. 595, -, 494 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1972).
97. Id. at-, 494 P.2d at 1372.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at -, 494 P.2d at 1372-73.





106. See notes 147-63 infra and accompanying text.
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(1)(a) (1981).
108. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ark. 1981) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-86-
102 (1987)). See generally Walker, Strict Liability, supra note 1, at 1 (explores the extent to which
courts have expanded the definition of "product").
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by the defendant builder."' The plaintiffs were not the first owners of
the home; however, the initial purchasers only owned the home for nine
months before selling it to the plaintiffs.11 After moving into the home,
the plaintiffs noticed that the carpet in the house emitted a strong odor of
formaldehyde." 2
The Blagg court first considered the extension of warranties beyond
the initial purchaser and found no reason why builder-vendors should
escape liability to subsequent purchasers of real estate." 3 This liability
remains intact "for a reasonable length of time where there is no substan-
tial change or alteration in the condition of the building from the original
sale."' "
14
Next, the court considered the definition of the word "product"
within the statutory language of the Arkansas strict liability statute."'
Citing Schipper, the Arkansas Supreme Court summarily concluded that
houses were "products.""II 6 The Blagg court gave more consideration to
the issue of whether strict liability in tort could be imposed when the
plaintiff has suffered purely economic losses. Economic loss is loss affili-
ated with damage to the defective product itself 1 7 as opposed to personal
injury or property damage caused by a defective product." 8 On this is-
sue, the Blagg court adopted the New Jersey Supreme Court's view that
purely economic loss can be recovered under strict liability in tort.19
B. Courts Holding That Strict Liability in Tort Does Not Apply to
Real Estate
The Oregon Supreme Court decided a case in 1977 which demon-
strates a more cautious approach to the imposition of strict liability in
tort for builder-vendors.' 20 In Chandler v. Bunick,121 the court declined
109. 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981). See also Note, Liability of Builder-Vendor Blagg v. Fred
Hunt Co., 35 ARK. L. REv. 654 (1982).





115. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1979). This statute, as cited in Blagg has been re-
codified as ARK. CODE ANN. 4-86-102 (1987).
116. Blagg, 612 S.W.2d at 324.
117. Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 128 N.H. 358, 513 A.2d 951 (1986), overruled on other
grounds, Lempke v. Dagenais, No. 87-006 (N.H. Aug. 8, 1988) (1988 WL 92565 (N.H.)).
118. Id at -, 513 A.2d at 952.
119. Blagg, 612 S.W.2d at 323-24 (citing Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965)).
120. Chandler v. Bunick, 279 Or. 353, 569 P.2d 1037 (1977).
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to impose strict liability in tort on builders. The defendant in Chandler,
was a builder who constructed a house for the plaintiffs. 122 Soon after
moving into the home, the plaintiffs realized that an inadequate septic
system had been installed by the defendant, causing sewage to back up
into the house. 123 Further, the plaintiffs learned that the defendant knew
that the septic system was not adequate to gain the approval of county
officials. 124
The Chandler court's holding was confined to situations involving
custom-built homes as opposed to mass produced homes.'25 Under the
court's rationale, however, a very important characteristic of strict liabil-
ity in tort was expressed. The court stated that strict liability is only
imposed in "response to some demonstrated public need where tradi-
tional legal theories have been found inadequate to the task."' 26 The
court ultimately held that the plaintiff could not recover under strict lia-
bility because alternative contract remedies were available. 127
In a case decided the same year as Chandler, the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected the holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Schip-
per.128 In Chapman v. Lily Cache Builders, Inc., 29 the plaintiffs had
purchased a house built by the defendant contractor under a contract
between the two parties.1 3 ° The plaintiffs' minor daughter was injured
after falling on a staircase defectively built by the defendants.' 3 ' The
plaintiffs sought recovery under strict liability in tort.'3 2 Although Illi-
nois did not recognize strict liability in tort for builder-vendors, the
plaintiff pointed to the trend in other jurisdictions supporting such liabil-
ity. 1 3 3 Declining to adopt the concept, the Chapman court noted that
there were "apparent" differences between manufacturers of goods and
builders of homes. 131
Another decision declining to apply strict liability in tort to a home
121. Id. at -, 569 P.2d at 1039.
122. Id. at-, 569 P.2d at 1038.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at -, 569 P.2d at 1039.
126. Id.
127. Id. at -, 569 P.2d at 1040.
128. Chapman v. Lily Cache Builders, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 3d 919, 362 N.E.2d 811 (1977).
129. Id. at-, 362 N.E.2d at 811.




134. Id. at -, 362 N.E.2d at 813.
[Vol. 24:117
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss1/5
STRICT LIABILITY FOR BUILDERS
builder was given in Wright v. Creative Corp. 3' In Wright, a five-year-
old boy ran into a sliding glass door installed in the home by the defend-
ant developer. 36 The glass door shattered, cutting the child. 137  The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was strictly liable for installing a de-
fective glass door.138 The Wright court rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion
to follow the trend set in Schipper 139 and reasoned that the rationale for
strict liability in tort was not applicable even to mass producers of
homes."4 As the court pointed out, "[a] builder cannot easily limit his
liability by express warranties and disclaimers, and it is easier to trace a
defect to a builder than to a manufacturer as there is more opportunity to
make a meaningful inspection of a structure on real property."' 141 The
court concluded by stating that a cause of action in negligence was ade-
quate for the plaintiff.142
Unlike the decisions in Blagg and Schipper, several jurisdictions
have denied the imposition of strict liability in tort for builders when the
damage caused by the defect is characterized as economic loss. In Ellis v.
Robert C. Morris, Inc.,"a3 the court denied the imposition of strict liabil-
ity in tort on a builder who installed defective siding because only eco-
nomic losses were involved. 1" The court's rationale for its holding was
that a plaintiff's recovery of economic losses is best handled by contract
theories.1 5 In an additional blow to the plaintiff's cause of action in
strict liability, the Ellis court stated that strict liability in tort was not
applicable to builder-vendors because a buyer does not have a high "de-
gree of difficulty proving negligence on the part of the builder."' 46
V. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Although the courts are split in determining whether strict liability
in tort should be applied to real estate, the rationale behind denying ap-
plicability is most compelling. In light of the rationale for the inception
135. 498 P.2d 1179 (Colo. App. 1972).
136. Id. at 1180.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1182.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1182-83 (citing Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1972)).
142. Wright, 498 P.2d at 1183.
143. 128 N.H. 358, 513 A.2d 951 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Lempke v. Dagenais, No.
87-006 (N.H. Aug. 8, 1988) (1988 WL 92565 (N.H.)).
144. Id. at-, 513 A.2d at 954.
145. Id. at -, 513 A.2d at 955.
146. Id. at-, 513 A.2d at 953.
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of strict liability and the availability of alternative remedies, strict liabil-
ity in tort should not be imposed on builder-vendors.
Negligence can be differentiated from strict liability in tort, because
in a negligence action the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty on
the builder-vendor and a breach of that duty. Generally, the duty will be
to build the house using ordinary care, as measured by community stan-
dards for builders under similar circumstances. 147 In other words, strict
liability in tort is based on the nature of the product, while negligence is
based upon the conduct of the defendant. The burden of proving negli-
gence on the part of a builder is not unreasonable where there is a legiti-
mate defect.
A cause of action for defects in construction may also be predicated
on negligence per se.148 A builder's liability under negligence per se
evolves from a violation of a law, such as a provision of a building
code. 149 In Stephens v. Sterns,150 the Idaho Supreme Court held that
negligence per se can arise out of a violation of an ordinance as well as
from a violation of a statute.15' In Stephens, the court held that the
plaintiff, who owned a house built by the defendant, could bring a cause
of action based on negligence per se where the defendant had failed to
provide a handrail on a staircase, as required by the local building
code.' 52 The State of Connecticut has taken a different approach. Con-
necticut statutorily extends an implied warranty to the purchaser of a
new home that the builder has complied with the local building code. 53
The implied contractual warranty is another possible remedy-one
which is frequently confused with strict liability in tort. 154 As applied by
many courts, implied warranties are based both in contract and in tort.155
Generally, an implied warranty with regard to residential real estate
guarantees that a home will be "reasonably suitable for its intended use,
and not merely habitable."'5 6 While perfection is not required, a builder
will be held to a standard of workmanship based on the average level of
147. Williams v. Runion, 173 Ga. App. 54, 325 S.E. 2d 441 (1967).
148. See Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984).
149. Id. at -, 678 P.2d at 48.
150. Id. at -, 678 P.2d at 41.
151. Id. at-, 678 P.2d at 49.
152. Id.
153. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-121 (West 1986). See also Fava v. Arrigoni, 35 Conn.
Supp. 177, 402 A.2d 356 (1979).
154. See Hiner, supra note 1, at 397.
155. Id.
156. 3 AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D (LCP BW) § 38:7 (1987).
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skill and intelligence possessed by other builders."5 7 Subsequent purchas-
ers of homes may not be able to assert a cause of action based on implied
warranty, though, because most jurisdictions require privity of
contract. 158
Finally, a buyer may recover against a builder by establishing fraud
or misrepresentation on the part of the builder. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 353 specifically provides for liability for vendors who
conceal or fail to disclose a condition which poses an unreasonable risk
to the vendee.15 9 However, liability predicated on § 353 dissolves when a
vendee has discovered the dangerous condition and has had a reasonable
opportunity to take precautions. 16"
Contrary to the statement of the court in Gay v. Cornwall,16 1 the
plaintiff's choices are not limited to caveat emptor or strict liability in
tort. Several effective alternative remedies exist. The existence of these
alternative remedies necessarily precludes the application of strict liabil-
ity in tort. As stated in Chandler, "[o]rdinarily, the imposition of strict
liability is the response to some demonstrated public need where the
traditional legal theories have been found inadequate to the task."'
62
Home buyers have numerous adequate remedies at their disposal to re-
cover for meritorious claims against builders.163
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of strict liability in tort has proven to be a good tool
for consumers who were oppressed for many years by the theory of ca-
veat emptor. Strict liability in tort, however, has been extended far be-
yond its logical boundaries. Because adequate alternative remedies exist
in the real estate context, strict liability in tort should not be applied in
this area as a weapon with which to attack builder-vendors who are not




158. Hiner, supra note 1, at 398-99.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
160. 3 AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D (LCP BW) § 38:17 (1987).
161. 6 Wash. App. 595, -, 494 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1972).
162. Chandler v. Bunick, 279 Or. 353, -, 569 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1977).
163. See Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 128 N.H. 358, 513 A.2d 951, 953 (1986).
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